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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM F. WEBB, Trustee of
the WFPP TRUST,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 910318

FREDERICK PAUL NINOW;
STACI L. NINOW; R-WEST, INC.,
a Corporation; WESTONE BANK,
UTAH, a Corporation; HOMER
CUTRUBUS; NED F. PARSON;
JIM HART; and COMMERCIAL
FACTORS OF SALT LAKE CITY,
LTD., a Limited Partnership,

Priority No.

16

Defendants/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PARTIES
The parties are William F. Webb, Trustee of the WFPP Trust,
plaintiff/appellant

(hereinafter "lessor") and WestOne Bank of

Utah, defendant/appellee (hereinafter "bank").
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Rule 3,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the district court rule correctly that the bank's

perfected security interest is superior to lessor's lien, even

though the lessor's lien was properly preserved and was prior in
time to the perfected security interest?1
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a
legal conclusion, this court should accord it no deference, and
should apply a "correction of error" standard of review.2
Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988); Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

1

Under § 38-3-2, U.C.A., 1990.

2

Standards of Review.

(a) Trial court's interpretation of statute presents question
of law reviewed on appeal for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City,
798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990).
(b) The appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions
of law no particular deference, but reviews them for correctness.
When the trial court makes findings of fact based on the parties'
stipulated facts, the appellate court treats these findings as
conclusions of law. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title
Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988).
(c) When reviewing an appeal from a summary iudgment, the
appellate court inquires whether there is any genuine issue as to
any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The appellate
court will liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment.
Transamerica Cash
Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 798 P.2d 24 (Utah
1990); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989).

2

STATUTE
Lessor's Liens.
38-3-1. Lien for rent due.
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have a lien
for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee
brought or kept upon the leased premises so long as the
lessee shall occupy said premises and for 30 days
thereafter.
38-3-2. Priority of lessor's lien.
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be preferred
to all other liens or claims except claims for taxes and
liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title,
perfected security interests, and claims of employees for
wages which are preferred by law; provided, that when a
lessee shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, or shall make an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or when his
property shall be put into the possession of a receiver,
the lien herein provided for shall be limited to the rent
for ninety days prior thereto.
38-3-3.

Attachment in aid of lien.

Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under a lease,
or the lessee shall be about to remove his property from
the leased premises, the lessor may have the personal
property of the lessee which is upon the leased premises
and subject to such lien attached without other ground
for such attachment.
38-3-4.

Attachment—Affidavit and bond.

The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of
attachment file a complaint, and an affidavit duly sworn
to setting forth the amount of rent due over and above
all offsets and counterclaims and a brief description of
the leased premises, and shall further state, under oath
that such writ of attachment is not sued out for the
purpose of vexing or harassing the lessee; and the person
applying for such writ of attachment shall execute and
file a bond as in other cases of attachment.
3

38-3-5. When attachment will issue—Determination of
priorities.
Upon the filing of such complaint, affidavit, and bond it
shall be the duty of the court wherein the same are filed
to issue a writ of attachment to the proper officer,
commanding him to seize the property of the defendant
subject to such lien, or so much thereof as will satisfy
the desmand, and to make a determination of the priorities
of the claims, liens, and security interests in such
property.
38-3-6.

Execution of writ of attachment.

It shcill be the duty of the officer to whom the writ of
attachment is directed to seize the property of such
lessee subject to such lien, or as much thereof as shall
be necessary to satisfy such debt and costs, and to keep
the same until the determination of the action, unless
the property is sooner released by bond or the attachment
is discharged.
38-3-7.

Release of attachment—Bond.

A bond for the release of the attached property may be
given, and motion to discharge the attachment may be
made, as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure in cases
of attachment.
38-3-8.

When chapter not applicable.

This chapter shall not be applicable to a written lease
for a term of years in which, as part of the consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a
building or improvements upon the leased premises.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the Case
This appeal concerns the priority of claims to security

4

interests in equipment used in a business.3
(b) Course of Proceedings
Lessor filed its complaint and amended complaints and obtained
a writ of attachment on the equipment.

All defendants except the

bank defaulted. The bank answered the complaints claiming its perfected security interest was superior to lessor's lien.

The trial

court disposed of the issue on cross motions for summary judgment
ruling in favor of the bank.
(c) Disposition at Trial Court
The trial court ruled that the bank's perfected

security

interest was superior to the lessor's lien, even though it was
perfected after the lessor's lien attached to the collateral.
FACTS4
The

stipulated

facts

are

that

lessor

building located in Salt Lake City, Utah.

owns

a

commercial

On July 2, 1988, the

lessee leased space from lessor in which to conduct a business.5
The lease ran from July 1, 1988 to August 31, 1993.

Prior to

3

The equipment is laminating equipment. The equipment was
sold for $150,000 by stipulation of lessor and the bank with the
liens to attach to the proceeds.
4

The facts are stipulated. (R353-355) and (Transcript pages
1 and 5 ) .
5

The lease was between plaintiff WFPP Trust, as lessor, and
Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow and R-West Systems, Inc., a
Utah corporation, as lessee. (R-9).
5

August 4, 1988, lessee moved equipment necessary for its business
onto the leased premises.

The lessee failed to make its monthly

payment. On January 24, 1990 lessee abandoned the leased premises.
On February 2, 1990, lessor filed its complaint and on February 22,
1990 obtained a writ of attachment on lessee's equipment located on
the leased premises.
Lessee applied for a line of credit, and in December, 1988,
obtained a $150,000 line of credit from the bank. The bank took a
security interest in the equipment which was located on the leased
premises. The bank filed its financing statement November 8, 1988.
(R-249)

The bank also obtained an assignment of a third party's

security interest in the equipment with a financing statement filed
August 4, 1988.

(R-249)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1.

Lessor's lien is superior to the bank's lien because it

was perfected in accordance with §§ 38-3-1 through 38-3-6 and
attached to the collateral prior to the bank's perfected security
interest.
2. The historical development of landlord priority rights in
common law distress actions and statutory lien rights indicate that
lessor's liens are superior to competing security interests which
are perfected after the inception of the lease and the collateral
coming onto the leased premises.
6

3.

The trial court did not consider the rule enunciated in

Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq., N.V., 663 P.2d 56 (Utah 1983) which
provides that when the lessor's lien is prior in time to the bank
and the lessor then files a complaint against the lessee, requests
a writ of attachment, and executes on the writ, the lessor's
statutory lien is perfected and is superior to the bank's perfected
security interest.
4. The Utah statute6 may not apply because the lessee agreed
to

make

improvements

to

the

real

property

as

part

of

the

consideration for the lease.7
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER
SS 38-3-1 THROUGH 38-3-8, U.C.A., 1990
AND UTAH CASE LAW
Lessor contends that it has a statutory lien under § 38-3-1
which is prior and superior to the bank's perfected security
interest.

Section 38-3-1 creates a limited lessor's lien which

6

§§ 38-3-1 through 38-3-6, U.C.A., 1990.

7

38-3-8. When chapter not applicable.

This chapter shall not be applicable to a written lease
for a term of years in which, as part of the
consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect
a building or improvements upon the leased premises.
7

provides that lessors shall have a lien for rent due upon all nonexempt property of lessee brought or kept upon the leased premises
so long as the lessee shall occupy the premises and for 30 days
thereafter.

The lessor's lien terminates 30 days after the lessee

quits the premises.

The lessor's lien would have expired 30 days

from January 24, 1990, i.e. February 24, 1990. Eason v. Wheelock,
101 Utah 162, 120 P.2d 319 (1941).

However, lessor preserved its

statutory lien by complying with the terms established by U.C.A.,
1990, sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-6, including filing a complaint
against the lessee, requesting and obtaining a writ of attachment
and executing upon the writ within the 30 day period.
perfected

Lessor

its statutory lien and is prior and superior to the

bank's security interest. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq., N.V., 663
P.2d 56 (Utah 1983).
Utah Lessor's Lien vs. Perfected Security Interest in a
Nutshell8
(a)

Events

The cases discuss the following events in lessor lien and
perfected security interest transactions:
The critical events for the lessor's lien are:

8

(1)

Lease creation.

(2)

Collateral coming onto the premises.

See Addendum Schedule "A" for a diagram of this material.
8

(3)

Lessee's failure to pay rent.

(4)

Lessee ending occupancy of the premises.

(5)

Lessor's filing complaintf affidavit, and bond
for writ of attachment within 30 days of event
(4).

(6)

Execution of writ of attachment on collateral.

The critical events for the competing security interest are:

(b)

(1)

Perfection of the security interest.

(2)

Loan advances.

Kappos9

In Kappos, the events occurred in the following order:
(1)

Perfection of competing security interest
(purchase money chattel mortgage in sheep).

(2)

Lease creation.

(3)

Collateral coming onto the premises.

(4)

Additional cash advances and renewal of chattel
mortgage.

(5)

Lessee's failure to pay rent.

(6)

Lessee ending occupancy of the premises
the sheep).

(selling

In Kappos the competing security interest (purchase money chattel
mortgage) was perfected prior to the inception of the lease, and
the court held for the purchase money chattel mortgage holder.
(c)

9

Citizens

Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936).
9

In Citizens, the events occurred in the following order:
(1)

Lease creation.

(2)

Collateral coming
equipment).

(3)

Lessee's failure to pay rent.

(4)

Lessee ending occupancy of the premises.

(5)

Lessor's filing of complaint after 30 days.

(6)

Perfection of a competing security interest.

onto the premises

(restaurant

The filing of the complaint was beyond 30 days from the lessee
quitting the premises.

Therefore, there was no valid lessor's

lien, and the court held against the lessor.

But the court stated

that had the lessor filed its complaint and taken steps to obtain
a writ of attachment on the collateral within 30 days after the
lessee quit the premises, the lessor's lien would be prior to the
competing perfected security interest.
Thus, it is clear from the Citizens case that the perfected
security interest does not always prevail over a lessor's lien.
The clear implication is that if the lessor's lien attaches first
and is properly preserved by the lessor filing its complaint for a
writ of attachment on the collateral within 30 days after the
lessee ends its occupancy, the lessor's lien is superior to the
competing perfected security interest.
(d)

Webb

In Webb, the events occurred in the following order:
10

(1)

Lease inception.

(2)

Collateral onto the premises.

(3)

Perfection of competing security interest.

(4)

Lessee's failure to pay rent.

(5)

Lessee ending occupation of the premises.

(6)

Lessor's filing complaint, affidavit, and bond for
writ of attachment on collateral within 30 day
period.

(7)

Writ of attachment executed on collateral.

Lessor should prevail because its lessor's lien attached at
the inception of the lease when the collateral was brought onto the
premises. Although the bank perfected a security interest prior to
lessor's timely filing of complaint for writ of execution, the
lessor's lien should prevail because it attached first and was
subsequently preserved.
POINT II
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER COMMON LAW
DISTRESS
AND
THE
DEVELOPMENT
OF
STATE
STATUTORY LANDLORD LIENS
History of Landlord Liens10
(a)

Common Law

A common law lien depends upon an independent and exclusive
10

The following is a summary taken from 49 Am. Jur. 2d
Landlord and Tenant, "Landlord's Lien," §§ 675-676, §§ 686-695 and
§§ 717-726 (1970); not all sections are summarized.

11

possession of the property against which the lien is certain.

It

is based directly upon the idea of possession, apart from an actual
seizure of property upon demised premises. When seizure is used,
it is by levy of a distress for rent in arrears whereby the
landlord acquires in effect a lien on the tenant's property for
past due rent.

A landlord by virtue of his position has no lien

upon any property of his tenant as security for rent, in the
absence of contract or statute.

Thusf a lien in favor of the

landlord, as distinguished from his right to distrain, arises only
from a statute creating such a lien, or from the agreement of the
tenant giving a lien.
(b)

Statutory Liens

The statutes of many states give landlords a lien for rent
upon the property of their tenants.

The tenant's properties are

simply charged with the lien of the landlord. Filing or recording
the lease are not prerequisites to the right of a landlord to a
statutory lien. The Uniform Commercial Code provides that Article
9 thereof on secured transactions does not apply to a landlord's
lien. Statutes giving the landlord a lien for rent on the property
of his tenant are considered to be the outgrowth of the common law
right of distress, and the principles controlling in cases of
distress are often resorted to in determining the rights of the
parties under such statutes. Wolcott v. Ashenfelter, 5 N.M. 442,
12

23 P. 780 (1890).

The statutory lien of the landlord for rent

attaches at the beginning of the tenancy, or when the chattels are
brought upon the premises.

Such a lien does not depend upon a

levy, and exists independently of the institution of any proceeding
for its enforcement. The remedy by levy, distress, or attachment,
is simply to enforce a lien already existing.

Gila Water Co. v

Int'l Finance Corp., 13 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1926).

The landlord's

statutory lien must be enforced by judicial proceedings. Provision
is made in some statutes for enforcing the lien by attachment. In
some jurisdictions, the landlord is required to enforce his lien
within a specified time; otherwise, it is lost.
(c) Priorities
A landlord's lien for the payment of rent is superior to any
judgment or other lien acquired subsequently to the creation of the
tenancy or the bringing of property onto the rented premises.
Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 21 So. 2d 361 (1945).
Under statutes giving a lien upon all property of the lessee
kept on the demised premises which shall be superior to any lien
acquired subsequently to the bringing of such property on the
premises, it has been held that the landlord's lien is inferior to
that of another where the latter was acquired either prior to the
bringing of the property in question upon the leased premises, or
prior to the commencement of the tenancy under the lease, and
13

therefore thcit the landlord's lien did not attach absolutely to
such property.

Ruqe v. Webb Press Co>, 71 Fla. 536, 71 So. 627

(1916).
Under landlord's lien statutes confining the lien conferred to
the goods of the tenant, it is uniformly held that the lien does
not have priority over the rights of the conditional seller of
property to the tenant, but is inferior thereto.
27 N.M. 194, 199 P. 364 (1921).

Bebee v. Fouse,

The right of landlord and tenant,

by lease contract, to create in favor of the landlord, a lien on
goods bought by the tenant on conditional sale, superior to the
rights of the conditional vendor, has been denied, at least as to
goods purchased after the execution of the lease.

But where the

conditional seller is notified of the terms of the lease, the
landlord's contractual lien has been held superior. Luce v. Stott
Realty Co., 201 Mich. 587, 167 N.W. 869 (1918).
Generally, a landlord's lien created by statute has been held
to be superior to a chattel mortgage given by the tenant after he
has rented or entered into possession of the premises.
White, 94 U.S. 382 (1877).

Beall v.

In many cases, the superiority of the

landlord's lien has been based upon the ground that the mortgagee
was charged with notice of the lien.
678,

192 N.W. 198 (1923).

Weiqand v. Hyde, 109 Neb.

Sometimes the superiority of the

landlord's lien has been based upon the mortgagee having actual
14

knowledge of the existing tenancy.
257, 62 N.W. 344 (1895).

Crockett v. Bearce, 104 Mich.

In some cases, the landlord's lien has

been held to be superior to a chattel mortgage given by a tenant,
without regard to the time when the latter was given, even though
it was given before the beginning of the tenancy, but these
generally are explained by the fact that the applicable lien
statute by its terms or by necessary
priority.

implication

gave such

Where a chattel mortgage is given on the property of a

person before he rents or leases premises from another, or before
such property is brought on the premises, it is generally held that
the mortgage is superior to the landlord's lien for rent.
(d)

Distress

Distress for rent in arrears, whereby the landlord may seize
personal property on the demised premises, is one of the oldest, as
well as one of the most efficient, of the common law remedies for
the collection of rent.
Cir. 1908).

Re West Side Paper Co., 162 F. 110 (3d

The remedy had its origin in the feudal tenures and

appears to have arisen when the common law process of gavelet and
cessavit, by which the landlord could seize the land itself for
rent in arrears and hold it until payment was made, fell in disuse.
When these remedies fell into disuse, distresses appeared to have
arisen whereby instead of seizing the land, the landlord seized all
movables on the land and held them until he received payment.
15

Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U.S. 631 (1912).

The right to distrain

arises from the moment the relation of landlord and tenant is
established, and as administered at common law, the remedy is
enforceable against any removable property found upon the demised
premises, whether belonging to the tenant or to a stranger.
POINT III
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER THE CITIZENS
BANK V. ELKS BLDG. CASE11 WHICH WAS NOT
CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT
Oral Argument12
(a) Bank's Arguments
During the oral argument before the trial court, the bank's
attorney recited the facts.13
With regards to the law, bank's counsel recited § 38-3-2 to
the court and argued that the landlord has a prior lien, except as
to

taxes, mechanic

11

liens, perfected

security

interests, and

Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., N.V., 663 P.2d 56 (Utah 1983).

12

A copy of the trial court transcript is attached as an
addendum.
13

The lease commenced July 2, 1988. The landlord's lien
attaches at the start of the tenancy. The perfected security
interest dates from August 4, 1988. The equipment was brought on
the premises prior to August 4, 1988. The lease is in default, and
the lessee owes the lessor $95,000. The bank loan is in default in
the amount of $150,000. The collateral was sold by stipulation for
$150,000 and the competing liens attached to the proceeds.
16

employee wage earnings.

His argument is that the statute means

what it says; perfected security interest has priority over a
landlord lien no matter when it is perfected.
He argues that there is no guidance in the cases. He referred
to Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936), in which a
purchase money security interest was held to be prior to the
landlord's lien, but stated that the facts are distinguishable. He
also stated that four other cases from other jurisdictions held the
landlord's lien to be superior to a perfected security interest,
but stated that none of the four jurisdictions have a statute like
Utah's.

Bank's counsel argued that where the priority is not set

forth in a landlord lien statute, that the court then looks back to
the common law, and the priority is given to the first attaching
lien.

If there is no statute, the landlord wins if his lien first

attached.

He further argued that if our Utah statute does not

apply to all perfected security interests, but is limited to prior
perfected

security interests, then there is no need for the

statute, i.e. we would be where we were under common law.
Bank's counsel also argued that there was a good policy reason
for the Utah Legislature changing from the common law priorities to
making all perfected security interests superior to landlords
liens.

He argued that the Legislative policy reason was to allow

lessees to borrow money and to allow banks to take security
17

interests without worrying about landlord liens.14
The bank also argued that for the term "perfected security
interest" not to have priority over a landlord lien unless it was
created prior to the landlord's lien, the same principle, i.e.
priority of creation, should be applied to all the other statutory
exceptions, i.e. tax liens, employee wage claims, and mechanic
liens.15
(b) Lessor's Arguments
Lessor's legal counsel in its presentation to the trial court
agreed on the facts and the issue and stated that the Utah statute
codifies the* common law.

Lessor's counsel referred to Gray v.

Kappos. which involved § 52-3-2 Revised Statutes, 1933, as amended,
14

The reason for the statute being changed by the Utah
Legislature is contained in Senate Bill 191, which was to make
corrections to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. In 1977, the
phrase "mortgages for purchase money" was deleted, and the phrase
"perfected security interest" was implemented in its place. The
Uniform Commercial Code introduced the wording "security interest"
to replace all other types of liens, such as chattel mortgages,
hypothecations, pledges, conditional sales, and the like. Thus,
the statutory change appears to have been made for these purposes
rather than as a thoughtful analysis as to policy and priorities
between competing interests such as banks and landlords.
15

It should be noted that banks commonly use landlord
subordination agreements before making loans to known lessees. The
bank could have avoided the risk of the landlord having a superior
lien by using a landlord subordination agreement. Originally, the
bank pleaded as an affirmative defense a landlord subordination
agreement, but apparently there was no such subordination in this
case. (R-116)
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where the landlord lien was preferred to all other liens except
claims for taxes, mechanic's liens, mortgages for purchase money,
and employee claims for wages.

The only statutory change in the

present statute § 38-3-2 is that mortgages for purchase money has
been eliminated and perfected security interest inserted in its
place.
The facts of the Kappos case are that the bank loaned Kappos
$2,000 in October of 1928 to purchase sheep. The bank took a note
and mortgage.

In January, 1929, a grazing lease was entered into

and the real property was used for grazing sheep for several years.
The note went into default and was renewed with additional monies
being advanced.

The first mortgage was never released; it was a

renewal, not a new transaction.

The sheep were sold in 1932, and

the landlord sought to satisfy its rent from the sale of the sheep.
The bank's lien came into being before the inception of the lease
and before the sheep were placed on the premises.

The landlord

claimed priority over the bank's advances made after the lease
inception and after the sheep entering the premises.

The bank's

mortgage was not recorded but was valid against those with actual
notice. The landlord acquired no rights greater than the lessee's.
The landlord's lien attached to what the lessee had, and the
lessee's rights were subject to the purchase money mortgage;
therefore, the landlord's lien was also subject to a prior purchase
19

money mortgage.
Mr. Orton, lessor's counsel, argued that the first event in
this case was the lease commencing July 1, 1988; secondly, the
equipment coming onto the premises; and thirdly the bank obtaining
a perfected security interest. In the Kappos case, the first event
was the creation of the chattel mortgage; the second event was the
inception of the lease; the third event was the sheep coming on the
premises; and the fourth event was the subsequent renewal note.
Mr. Orton argued that the Legislature intended prior perfected
security interests to prevail, but that if subsequent perfected
security interests prevail over prior landlord liens, that the
landlord could be deprived of his lien through "sham transactions."
A lessee could borrow money, give a perfected security interest,
and defeat a landlord lien. The trial court, Judge Stirba, asked
Mr. Orton if there were not remedies for that type of conduct under
the Uniform Commercial Code.

Mr. Orton responded that fraud

remedies are available, but that the rule from the Kappos case is
that the first in time prevails.

If the lease is first in time,

the equipment then comes onto the premises, and a security interest
is subsequently perfected, the landlord should prevail.
(c)

Trial Court's Decision

Following the oral presentations of counsel, trial judge
Stirba stated that she had reviewed the pleadings and the cases,
20

particularly the Utah cases, and the prior and present statutes.
She

stated that the present

statute is susceptible to both

interpretations advanced by the respective legal counsel.

She

stated it was not abundantly clear what the Legislature intended,
and that the Legislature did not specify that security interests
had to be perfected prior to the equipment coming onto the
property.

She stated that she had considered the statute and the

exceptions to the landlord priority. She noted that the exceptions
for taxes, mechanic liens, and employee wages do not require that
they be established prior to the collateral coming onto the leased
premises.

She also noted that the statute says the lessor's lien

is preferred to all of the liens or claims except for . . .
"perfected security interests." She stated the Legislature has not
required that perfected security interests be perfected prior to
the property being brought onto the leasehold, and that because the
other lien exceptions do not have to be created prior to the
landlord lien to prevail, that a perfected security interest need
not be created prior to the landlord lien for it to prevail.

She

noted this is a case of first impression, and that sham may occur.
Her legal conclusion was that the statutory language does not
indicate that the Legislature intended the security interest to be
perfected prior to the collateral coming onto the property to
prevail. Therefore, the trial court granted WestOne Bank's motion
21

for summary judgment.
Citizens Bank Case
Unfortunately, the case Citizens Bank v. Elks Building, N.V. ,
663 P.2d 56 (Utah 1983), was not brought to the attention of the
court prior to her ruling.

In the Citizens case, Justice Stewart,

writing for a unanimous court, noted that the appeal therein
concerned the* priority of claims to a security interest in personal
property used in a restaurant that went out of business.

The

landlord (Elks Building), appellant, claimed a lien for unpaid
rents pursuant to U.C.A., 1990, § 38-3-1, and a provision in the
lease. The landlord contended its lien to be superior to Citizens
Bank's lien which was perfected under the provisions of the UCC to
secure a loan from the bank. The matter was adjudicated on crossmotions for summary judgment.

The trial court held for the bank,

and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The stipulated facts were that the Elks Building owned a
commercial building in Salt Lake City.
leased

space

restaurant.

from the Elks Building

On August 6, 1980, lessee
in which

to operate a

The lease ran from August 15, 1980 to February 14,

1981. The lessee moved equipment necessary for the restaurant onto
the lease premises, and in November, 1980, the lessee failed to
make its monthly payment. On December 8, 1980, the landlord served
notice of default, giving the lessee 30 days to pay the rent or
22

face legal action.

The lessee did not respond and the lessee

closed the restaurant December 15, 1980, leaving the equipment on
the premises.

The landlord padlocked the premises and took

possession of the equipment.

In March, 1981, the lessee applied

for a $70,000 loan from Citizens Bank, which was approved and
disbursed April 7, 1981. Citizens Bank took a security interest in
the collateral which included all the equipment and fixtures the
lessee owned, and included in the list was the restaurant equipment
which the lessee had left on the landlord's premises.
Bank

perfected

the

security

interest

by

filing

a

Citizens
financing

statement April 7, 1981. On April 9, 1981, the landlord filed its
complaint against the lessee for unpaid lease payment and asserted
the landlord's lien against the equipment.
The landlord obtained a default judgment, foreclosing the
lessee's interest in the restaurant equipment.

A sheriff's sale

was begun, and the bank presented its security interest claiming a
priority over the landlord judgment lien. The sheriff terminated
the sale because of the conflicting claims, and the lawsuit between
the Elks Building and Citizens Bank ensued.
The trial court ruled that the bank's security interest had
priority over the landlord lien, and the landlord appealed.

The

landlord contended that it had a statutory lien and a common law
contractual lien, and that both were prior to the bank's security
23

interest.

In the Citizens case, the bank contended that the

landlord liens were not valid, and even if they were valid, that
the bank's security interest would be superior.

The Utah Supreme

Court stated that the issues as to the validity of the landlord
liens are dispositive.
Justice Stewart

stated that § 38-3-1 creates a limited

lessor's lien which provides that lessor shall have a lien for rent
due upon all non-exempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon
the leased premises so long as the lessee shall occupy said
premises and for 30 days thereafter. This lien terminates 30 days
after the lessee quits the premises.

The lessor's lien expired

January 16, 1981, and barring a contractual lien, the lessor became
an unsecured creditor of the lessee after January 16, 1981, citing
Eason v. Wheelock, 101 Utah 162, 120 P.2d 319 (1941) and In re
Stone's Estcite, 14 Utah 205, 46 P. 1101 (1896).
Justice Stewart stated,
In these types of cases, lessors, to preserve
their statutory liens, must comply with the terms
established by U.C.A., 1953, §§ 38-3-3 through
38-3-6, including the 30-day period. These
sections permit the lessor to file a complaint
against the lessee, request a writ of attachment,
and execute on the writ. Had Tthe lessor1 done this,
its statutory lien would have been perfected, and
it would have been prior to the Bank's security
interest. (Emphasis added)
Citizens, 663 P.2d at 58.
The distinction between our case and the Elks Building case is
24

that in our case the lessor followed the statutory lien provisions,
i.e. filed a complaint against the lessee, requested a writ of
attachment, obtained a writ of attachment, and executed on the
writ.

All of this was done within 30 days of the lessee quitting

the premises.

By doing this, the lessor perfected its statutory

lien and is prior to the bank's security interest.
The court should follow the rule set forth in the Citizens
case and direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lessor.
POINT IV
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER COMMON LAW
FIRST TO ATTACH PRINCIPLES
Utah statutory lessor's liens are provided for in Chapter 3,
Sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-8 of U.C.A., 1990. When Chapter 3 is
not applicable, common law principles apply.16
Section 38-3-8 provides that "this chapter shall not be

16

Mr. Carney stated during his oral argument: "There are
also cited in the other side's brief four cases from other
jurisdictions. They do hold that the landlord's lien is superior
to the perfected security interest. However, in each one of those
cases, and in none of those cases, did the state involved have a
statute like ours that says, 'perfected security interest shall be
prior to the landlord's lien.' All of those cases, it was silent
on the subject, and simply said that the landlord would have a
lien. In which case, the court goes back to the common law, which
is first to attach liens. And if we didn't have this statute, I
would suspect that is what you would hear. The landlord would win,
the first to attach."
25

applicable to a written lease for a term of years in which, as part
of the consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a
building or improvements upon the leased premises."
exactly our fact situation.

This is

The lease was entered into July 2,

1988, and the term was for a period of five years and two months,
beginning the* first day of July 1988, and ending the 31st day of
August, 1993.
conditions."17

Lease Article XVIII provides for, "additional
The subject lease is for a term of years with part

of the consideration consisting of the lessee erecting improvements
upon the leased premises; therefore, Chapter 3 is not applicable to
this lease.

Under the common law, the lessee's lien attaches to

the property first and the landlord's lien has priority over the
subsequent lien of the bank.

17

Lessor and lessee agree that lessee shall accept the
building 'as is' condition and further agree as follows:
(1)
Lessor shall furnish and install concrete floor to match existing
in front of area of warehouse, approximately 30' x 110'; (2) lessor
shall furnish and install commercial grade carpet and base in
existing office area; (3) lessor and lessee each agree to pay onehalf the cost to enlarge one existing rollup door to 14' x 14'.
Final appearance shall match existing.
26

CONCLUSION
Lessor's lien is superior to the bank's later perfected
security interest and lessor, therefore, respectfully requests this
court to direct the trial court to enter judgment accordingly.
DATED this ^

day of October, 1991.

By
Robert F. 0rt6i
Milo S. Mats€ten, Jr.
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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MONDAY, JUNE 10, 1991
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Let's go on the record in the matter

of William F. Webb against Ninow# case No. 900900672.
on behalf of the plaintiff is Mr. Robert Orton.

Appearing

Appearing on

behalf of defendant West One Bank is Francis Carney.
The matter comes before the Court on West One Bank's
Motion for Summary Judgment and the
Partial Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff's Motion for

I reviewed the pleadings in the case

and I appreciate Mr. Carney's book here just summarizing the
pleadings and setting forth all of the courtesy copies of the
pleadings which are at issue, and I have reviewed those.
Mr. Carney, you may proceed.
MR. CARNEY:

Thank you. Your Honor.

Let me

briefly

highlight the facts and if I am telling you facts you already
know, please interrupt me.
THE COURT:

I guess the facts are not in dispute.

You folks are in agreement as to when these things all occurred.
It is just as I see it: the legal question of whether that is
a timing element in this.
MR. CARNEY:

Yeah, and in that regard the timing

element is that the lease is July 2nd of '88 and I think the
cases do hold that the landlord's lien attaches as of the start
of the tenancy.

That would be July 2nd of '88.

And then we have the first in a series of perfected

1

1

security interest, all of which now are the bank loans starting

2

August 4, 1988.

3

premises sometime before the fourth of August, 1988.

4

a default in the lease.

5

The bcink is in default on the bank loans, owed about $150,000.

6

?

And we have the equipment brought onto the
We have

The landlord is owed about $95,000.

The Court may not be aware of this, but the
J collateral has been taken off the premises by stipulation of

8

everyone.

9

and sold it and got the $150,000 for the collateral, and that

We happened to find a buyer who took the collateral

10

is sitting now in a bank account gathering interest, by

11

stipulation of everyone.

12

treat the priority issues as if the equipment were still on the

13

premises.

14

We have agreed that we would still

The Statute is 38-3-2, the landlord's lien statute.

15

it says landlords have prior liens, have a lien which is prior

16

to everybody except taxes, mechanic's liens, perfected security

17

interest and employee's wage earnings.

18

that this statute means what it says.

19

security interest, therefore we are prior to the landlord's lien

20

Our position simply is
We have a perfected

Now, as I understand Mr, Orton's position is that

21

the statute doesn't mean all perfected interest.

It means only

22

perfected security interest which were perfected prior to the

23

time the equipment came on or the collateral came onto the

24

property.

25

second event, collateral comes onto the property.

In other words, if you had lease, first event;
Third event.

bank takes a lien, perfected security interest rather, that type
of security interest would not be prior since it arose after
the date the collateral was on the premises.

That is the issue:

"Is that so was not so?"
I find no guidance one way or the other in the cases.
There is an old 1936 case referred to by Mr. Orton called
Grey vs. Cappos, involving some sheep.

The court held that the

purchase money security interest was prior to the landlord's
lien.

But I don't think the facts are quite similar to this

case, and the court doesn't really give us any guidance.
There are also cited in the other side's brief four
cases from other jurisdictions.

The do hold that the landlord's

lien is superior to the perfected security interest.

However,

in each one of those cases, and in none of those cases, did
the state involved have a statute like ours that says "perfected
security interest shall be prior to the landlord's lien."
All of those cases, it was silent on the subject and simply said
that the landlord would have a lien.

In which case, the court

goes back to the common law which is first to attach liens.

And

if we didn't have this statute, I would suspect that is what you
would to hear.

The landlord would win, the first to attach.

If we were to interpret the statute to mean not
perfected security interest, but prior perfected security
interest, I suspect there would be no reason to have this statute
iThat would bring us back to where we were under the common law;

3

first to attach liens.

I suggest that this is a change, perhaps

for a good policy reason.

A change from the common law to allow

all perfected security interest to be superior to landlords'
liens.

Perhaps the reason was that to allow people who lease

premises to go out and borrow money and allow the banks to
take security interest and equipment which is on the premises
without worrying about the landlord.
The other side says "Well, in this case, the landlord
could be defrauded by sham security interest."

I guess that is

so, but I guess there is a way to look beyond sham security
interest.

I also suppose that the landlord could take his own

UCC-1 to cover future rents ahead.

I hadn"t really thought

that through, but it seems to me that if the landlord was that
concerned about the equipment, he could do that and then you wou
simply have a contest under UCC-9:

first to file will win.

Basically, though, what I am arguing, if the
legislature wanted to say "Prior perfected security interest
only," it would have said so, and it didn't.
security interest."

It says "perfected

We think the statute should be interpreted

according to what it says.
THE COURT:

Are you aware of any other cases, or any

case dealing with any of the other provisions in Section 38-3-2
that contrue it one way or the other, whether they have to be
established prior to the equipment being brought up to the
property or

—

4

MR. CARNEY:

I have found nothing.

THE COURT:

Or similar arrangement?

MR. CARNEY:

I have found absolutely nothing on this.

It says "perfected security interest."
1977 amendment.

I think that was a

Before that, I think it said "purchase money

security interest."

It goes back to 1898 and there is only

that "36 case and there is a '41 case which I think is also
referenced.
THE COURT:
MR. CARNEY:

The Eastman case?
Yes, and I don't think that gives us

much guidance either way.
One other thing, I think if we adopted Mr. Orton's
position to be logical it would seem to me that would also have
to apply to tax liens and to employee wage claims, and to
mechanics' liens.

So, for example, for tax liens they would

not have any priority unless they arose prior to the time the
lienable collateral was brought onto the premises.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Orton.

MR. ORTON:

It appears we are in total agreement on

the facts. Your Honor, and what the issue is.

I believe that

really the statute codifies what the common law is and I would
like to spend just a little bit of time talking about the Grey
vs. Cappos case.

The statute which was in effect at the time

of that case was 52-3-2, revised statutes of 1933.

And that

statute provided "that the lien provided for in this chapter

5

shall be preferred to all other liens

or claims, except claims

for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title,
mortgages for purchase money, and claims of employees for wages
which are preferred by law."
The current statute which was in effect at the time
this cause of action arose only makes one difference, and that
difference is instead of saying "mortgages for purchase money,"
it says "perfected security interest."
a lot of change in the two statutes.

So really I don't see
We are dealing now under

the UCC where security interests are required to be perfected
generally by UCC-1 filing.

So with that in mind, I think that

although the Grey vs. Cappos case doesn't come right down and
say it in so many words, it is helpful and let me just review
the facts of that case if I might briefly.
In October of 1982 the bank loaned Cappos $2,000 to
purchase sheep and Cappos gave the bank a note and a mortgage to
security payment of the purchase price.

Subsequently, in

January of 1929, the grazing lease was entered into.

And then

for several years thereafter, sheep were grazed on the landlord's
property during the summer months of each year.

After that

grazing lease was entered into, there was a default or non-paymen|t
of the note and mortgage, and the note and mortgage were renewed.
And then on at least two subsequent occasions, there was additional
money advanced and the note and mortgage were renewed.

There was|

|never a release given of the first mortgage and the Court found

6

that the intension of the mortgagor and mortgagee was that the
new transactions constituted a renewal, not a new transaction.
And that is the way the case went off, as I see it.

The sheep

were then sold in 1932, while on the premises of the landlord,
and the landlord brings suit to collect rentals due and owing
and seeks to have the sheep sold and collect the rent from the
sale of the sheep.
Now, as I understand what the court is saying in that
case is, No. 1, the parties intended each new transaction or
each new note and mortgage as a renewal of the first note and
mortgage.

And the earlier ones were not satisfied but there was

simply a renewal.

The court says that legal effect should be

given to the intent of the mortgagor and the mortgagee.
Further, the plaintiff does not claim that his lien
has priority over the first lien that was given, which came
before the lease and before the sheep were ever put on the
premises.

And, however, on the later advances of money, he

does claim that his lessor's lien is superior.

The court says

that the mortgage, though unrecorded, is valid as between the
mortgagor and the mortgagee and those with notice of the
mortgage.
And finally, the court says that the plaintiff acquired
no rights which Cappos, the owner of the sheep, did not have.
The lien attached to whatever rights Cappos did have.

And since

that right is subject to the purchase money mortgage, it must

7

follow that the lien of the plaintiff is also subject to it.
I think that language is very helpful.
Our case is different.

What we have here is, we

have a lease on July 1, 1988, followed by equipment coming onto
the premises.

And then subsequent to the lease and the equipment

coming onto the premises, there is a perfected security interest.
And that is where the difference comes in between our case and
the Cappos case; and that is that in our case the lease is
entered into and the equipment comes onto the premises before
any security interest.

And as I view what the court is saying,

the reason the court is holding against the plaintiff lessor in
this case is because it contrues the subsequent notes and
mortgages as renewals of the earlier mortgage which did come
before the lease and before the sheep were put on the premises.
Now, I really think that if that were not the
construction that the legislature intended to be given, that
certainly the lessor could be deprived of his lien rights though
a sham transaction.

A lessee presumably within a day or week

before the termination of the lease, seeing the lease coming
to an end and realizing he owes money on the lease, could borrow
money, give security against the property on the premises and
claim under the statute that the perfected security interest
given is superior to the lien of the lessor.
THE COURT:

Let's suppose the legislature did intend

that the statute not require perfection prior to the equipment.

8

1

property coming onto the leasehold.

2

And someone did try to defraud someone by perfecting a security

3

interest in order to avoid the responsibilities of paying the

4

leasehold and having a lien attached, would you see no remedy

5

whatsoever in the Uniform Commercial Code for that kind of

6

conduct?

7

MR. ORTON:

Assume that for a moment.

There might be a remedy based on fraud

8

or something of that nature, yes.

Yes.

I really find no law,

9

Your Honor, which would support the defendant's position in

10

this case.

And the law, we cited in our brief, I think, is

11

consistent with our position.

12

different and the statutes are somewhat different, I think if

13

you take everything we have cited and what I understand the

14

general law to be across the country, and then look at the one

15

Utah case we do have, and view the basis on which the Supreme

16

Court came down the way it did on this case, I think the logical

17

conclusion is that the lessor's lien in this case where the

18

lease was entered into first, the equipment came onto the

19

premises second, and then the security interest came after,

20

that the lessor's lien has priority.

Although the facts are somewhat

21

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

22

MR. ORTON:

Thank you.

23

THE COURT:

Mr. Carney.

24

MR. CARNEY:

25

A small point. Your Honor.

9 —

I can't

remember what it is -- 9104 says that in order to create a

1

security interest, you must give value and if no true value is

2

given, then there is no security interest and a sham could be

3

taken apart like that.

4

questions I haven't answered.

5

THE COURT:

I will submit it, unless there are

No, thank you.

I have reviewed the

6

pleadings as I indicated previously, and the cases that you have

7

cited, particularly the Utah cases.

8

I have looked at this statute and predecessor statute as well.

9

And I think that the statute may be suspectible to both

Mr. Orton, I think —

and

10

interpretations.

11

what the legislature intended with regard to that.

12

it don't specifically address whether the security interest had

13

to be perfected prior to the property equipment being brought

14

onto the premises.

15

interests that are accepted under it; specifically, the claims

16

for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title,

17

and claims of employees for wages which are preferred by law,

18

none of which, I believe, are required to be perfected prior

19

to the leasehold creations, if you will, and the interest coming

20

onto the property, if you will, under the leasehold.

21

statute does say "that the lien provided for in this chapter

22

shall be preferred to all of the liens or claims except for,

23

among the other things, perfected security interest."

24
25

I don't think that this is abundantly clear
At least,

I have considered the statute and the other

And the

After considering all of it and your arguments, as
well, I am persuaded that the legislature has not required that

1

the claimed security interest be perfected prior to the property

2

being brought onto the leasehold.

3

I don't see that the other interest there have to be perfected

4

either.

5

perfected security interest from other interest that it accepted

6

under that particular statute.

And I think that because

—

And the legislature hasn't seen fit to distinguish

This does seem to be a case of first impression,

7
8

at least so far as the perfected security interest language is

9

concerned.

And because it is my view that —

concern about

10

sham security interest may occur, I think there is some

11

safeguard for that.

12

the statute, although not as clear as every one would like it

13

to be, the plain reading of the statute does not indicate that

14

the legislature intended security interest to be perfected

15

prior to the property being secured from coming onto the

16

leasehold, and that would be my ruling, Mr. Carney, Mr. Orton.

17

Therefore, I am granting West One Bank's Motion for Summary

18

Judgment.

19

Summary Judgment.

Accordingly, I think that the language of

I am denying the plaintiff's Motion for Partial

20

Mr. Carney, I would like you to prepare Findings of

21

fact. Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with the

22

Court's ruling.

23
24

MR. CARNEY:

Thank you. Your Honor.
* * * * * * *

25
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ADDENDUM
Schedule "A"
Critical Events (time line
Lessor

Competing
Security
Interest Kappos

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

•

>

:

Lease inception;
Collateral onto premises;
Lessee's failure to pay rent;
Lessee's ending occupancy of premises;
Within 30 days, filing complaint,
affidavit, and bond for writ of
attachment on collateral.

(1) Perfection of competing security
interest.
(1) Perfection of competing security interest
(purchase money chattel mortgage on sheep
with lessor having actual notice);
(2) Lease inception;
(3) Collateral onto premises (sheep);
(4) Additional advance of monies and renewal
of note and chattle mortgage;
(5) Lessee's failure to pay rent;
(6) Lessee ending occupancy (selling sheep);
(7) Complaint.
Result: lessor loses.

Citizens

(1) Lease inception;
(2) Collateral onto premises (restaurant
equipment);
(3) Lessee's failure to pay rent;
(4) Lessee's ending occupancy of premises;
(5) After 30 days, filing complaint,
affidavit, and bond for writ of attachment on collateral;
(6) Perfection of competing security interest.
Result: lessor loses.

BUT on event (5), court says that had lessor
within 30 days filed complaint, affidavit, bond for writ of
attachment on collateral, result would be different.
Result: lessor wins.

Webb

>

(1) Lease inception;
(2) Collateral onto premises (laminating
equipment);
(3) Perfection of competing security
interest;
(4) Lessee's failure to pay rent;
(5) Lessee's ending occupancy of premises;
(6) Within 30 days, filing complaint,
affidavit, and bond for writ of attachment on collateral.
Result: lessor should win.

Discussion
The rule of Citizens is that not every perfected security
interest competing with a lessor's lien prevails. Citizens dicta
provides that a competing perfected security interest created
after the lessor's lien attaches and where the lessor's lien
(within 30 days of lessee's occupancy ending) is preserved by
lessor filing a complaint, affidavit and bond for writ of
attachment, results in the lessor winning.
The Webb case presents a slightly different fact situation.
What happens when (1) lessor's lien attaches; (2) the competing
security interest is perfected; and (3) the lessor timely files
its complaint, affidavit, bond and obtains a writ of attachment
on the collateral before the competing perfected security
interest takes any steps to foreclose its perfected security
interest? The lessor should prevail.

